Washington, D.C., December 18, 2024 – A now-legendary but long-secret 70-paragraph telegram written by the top political analyst at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in March 1994, E. Wayne Merry, criticizing the American policy focus on radical economic reform in Russia, was published in full today for the first time by the National Security Archive.

Merry could not get the critical message cleared for government-wide distribution at the time in 1994 because of Treasury objections (“It would give Larry Summers a heart attack”) and ultimately resorted to the Dissent Channel instead, according to Merry’s retrospective commentary, which was also published today by the Archive together with the actual “long telegram” and other declassified documents.

Reminiscent of George Kennan’s Long Telegram of 1946 in the depth and scope of its analysis of Russian realities and almost as prescient in its prophecies, the Merry cable only reached the public domain as the result of a National Security Archive lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The State Department denied a copy to Merry himself, claiming public release of dissent messages would provide the wrong incentive for future Foreign Service Officers.

Titled provocatively “Whose Russia Is It Anyway? Toward a Policy of Benign Respect,” the Merry long telegram argued that radical market reform was the wrong economic prescription for Russia, with its history of statist direction of the economy, uncertainty of political transition and extreme challenges of geography and climate. The message described “shock therapy” as so visibly Washington’s program that the devastating austerity already evident in 1994 was blamed on the U.S., and the long-term consequences would “recreate an adversarial relationship between Russia and the West.” Plus, Merry warned, “we will also fail on the economic front.”

The one-page official response from the State Department, required by State regulations to come from the Policy Planning Staff, did not even reach Moscow until Merry had already left the Embassy that summer. Merry read the formal response for the first time only this year, after the National Security Archive obtained both his original Dissent Channel cable and the State response as part of a FOIA lawsuit. The State response, signed by then Director of Policy Planning Jim Steinberg, commended Merry for his constructive use of the Dissent Channel, accepted some of his criticisms of U.S. aid programs in Russia, but, in a tone-deaf passage displaying no knowledge of Russia, told him he was wrong to separate markets from democracy as policy goals, because the former were essential to the latter.

“In my experience, Washington seeks to understand other countries by looking in the mirror (a common human failing),” comments Merry in his contextual essay.

This really fits very nicely with Ungar’s piece from yesterday.

Gert Ewen Ungar:

Das Problem ist nicht, wie Putin die Welt sieht, sondern wie man in Deutschland auf die Welt blickt – mit einem stark verzerrenden deutschen Filter vor den Augen.

Der Unterschied ist zudem, dass man sich in Russland der Begrenztheit der eigenen Sicht durchaus bewusst ist. Man spricht von der russischen Welt, der russischen Zivilisation. Die erstreckt sich zwar über einen weiten geographischen Raum, ist aber nicht endlos. Außerhalb der russischen Zivilisation gibt es andere Zivilisationen mit eigenen Wertesystemen, eigenen Traditionen, eigener Identität und einem sich daraus ableitenden Recht auf So-Sein, auf Existenz und Souveränität.

In Deutschland ist das anders. Da hält man die eigene Sicht für universell.

How do I want this book to be read? My answer may sound surprising and perhaps like wishful thinking. I would like this book, with its rolling analysis of the beginning of the armed conflict in Ukraine, to be read first and foremost because it records reactions to globally relevant processes.

Ω Ω Ω

First, the late Soviet and post-Soviet leadership became seen as nothing more than a corrupt, self-serving elite. The atomized masses responded with frequent but poorly organized and amorphous protests that, when successful, only reproduced and intensified the underlying crisis. Unlike social revolutions, the maidans did not bring radical transformations in favour of the popular classes; they typically only increased social inequality. The maidan revolutions did not even build a stronger state but only destabilized the existing one, allowing domestic and transnational elite rivals to seize the opportunity to advance their interests and agendas. The post-Soviet elite responded only with more coercion, which eventually escalated into war. This set the stage for the flourishing not of developmental national ideologies but of regressive neo-tribalist identities. There was no strong force from below to counteract this dynamic. The processes of the escalating crisis of hegemony are universal, but their manifestations in the post-Soviet space are of a rather unique magnitude.

—Volodymyr Ishchenko, Towards the Abyss: Ukraine from Maidan to War, (London: Verso, 2024), xiv, xxviii-xxix.

When I first read Ishchenko’s suggestion studying post-Soviet Ukraine provides useful insight into globally relevant processes I didn’t feel I understood what he meant, however the more I read Ishchenko’s work the more I get the feeling that as with John Dunlop’s writing on the late Yeltsin and early Putin years what is being described very much does provide a guide into processes currently shaping the West.

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Linken-Spitzenkandidat und Parteichef Jan van Aken Foto: Georg Wendt / dpa

In the interest of freedom and democracy Linke chief Jan van Aken suggests banning X in Europe, and replacing X with the EU’s own Twitter substitute.

Bundestagspräsidentin Bärbel Bas beendet die Sitzung: „Wir sind damit am Schluss, auch der Ampel.“

Berliner Zeitung Charles Freeman interview:

Mister Freeman, Sie haben 1972 als Diplomat die Reise von US-Präsident Richard Nixon nach China organisiert. Damals wurden die sino-amerikanischen Beziehungen aufgebaut. Mittlerweile ist das Verhältnis zwischen Washington und Peking abgekühlt. Wie bewerten Sie die derzeitige China-Strategie Washingtons?

Wir haben keine Strategie. Wir haben eine Einstellung oder eine Haltung. Aber für eine Strategie braucht man ein klares Ziel und die Ressourcen, um diese Ziele zu erreichen. Nichts davon existiert in der amerikanischen China-Politik. So wie wir gerade vorgehen, ist es in meinen Augen schlechter für uns als für die Chinesen. Wir haben die Chinesen dazu angeregt, ihre Wissenschaft und Technik zu verbessern, Handelsbeziehungen mit dem globalen Süden auszubauen, wir haben sie in die Arme der Russen getrieben und wir bringen sie dazu, Bündnisse im Nahen Osten zu schmieden, die den amerikanischen Einfluss in der Region zurückdrängen.

Ω Ω Ω

Wir sind Teilnehmer in einem Wettrennen, in dem wir von unseren Vorteilen überzeugt sind, die aber nicht existieren. Ich würde sagen, wir fordern China nur in unserer Vorstellung heraus, nicht in der wirklichen Welt.

Ω Ω Ω

Denn der Ukrainekrieg begann mit einer Anfrage Russlands, über eine neue europäische Sicherheitsarchitektur zu verhandeln. Die russische Regierung wies korrekterweise darauf hin, dass die Europäer nicht in der Lage seien, unabhängig darüber zu entscheiden, und vorher die USA um Erlaubnis fragen müssten. Washington lehnte ab.

Ω Ω Ω

Ich gehe davon aus, dass die USA Nord Stream gesprengt haben. Bis auf die Geschichten, die von verschiedenen Geheimdiensten in die Welt gesetzt werden, sehe ich keine plausible andere Erklärung.

Arman Spéth, Spectre Journal review of Ishchenko’s Towards the Abyss:

Therein lies the “truth” of the Kremlin’s propaganda, which publicly links the survival of the Russian nation with the victory in Ukraine: the “special operation” ensures the survival of Russia’s political capitalism.

Indeed, there are indications that important capitalist fractions in Russia are benefitting from the invasion. However, it remains unclear whether the political capitalists are the dominant group within the Russian elite, or whether there are other groups that are in favor of the war in Ukraine for other reasons. In Ishchenko’s analysis, it seems that the ruling classes in post-Soviet capitalist states consist exclusively of political capitalists, primarily motivated by the pursuit of “insider rents.” He does not distinguish between different segments of the bourgeoisie, some of which are not reliant on “insider rents” at all. For this reason Ishchenko’s analysis leaves important questions unresolved.

„Germany and the United States supply 99% of the weapons exported to Israel. They could stop this conflict overnight if they stopped the weapons that kill the Palestinians.“

Gert-Ewen Ungar, RT:

Ziel der Einschränkung der Pressefreiheit in Deutschland ist die Durchsetzung des regierungsoffiziellen Narrativs zu den großen politischen Themen. Geduldet werden in Deutschland lediglich undifferenzierte, holzschnittartige Darstellungen, die einem einfachen Gut-Böse-Schema folgen. In der Folge wirken deutsche Diskussionen zu geopolitischen Themen oft tief provinziell und weltfremd – eine notwendige Folge eines beschränkten Zugangs zu Informationen.